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Abstract 
A conceptual analysis of modelling is under-
taken. The major challenges posed by the
growth of open and integrated systems
prompts a careful rethinking of the basis of
modelling. Particular attention is paid to ob-
ject-oriented modelling. Our approach is
characterized by an analytic framework bor-
rowed from the philosophy of language called
theories of reference (ToRs). This body of the-
ories aims at accounting for how expressions
of language may actually refer to the real
world, very much the same task as in model-
ling. As opposed to most of the related work
in the literature, we see this body of theories
as a rich class. We argue that a number of the
alternative approaches to modelling should
be acknowledged to have important and rele-
vant similarities with a rich body of ToRs.
Our principal aim, besides the more immedi-
ate one to correct what we argue are philo-
sophically inaccurate interpretations, is to
encourage a more fruitful discussion regard-
ing modelling. Working out a basis for mod-
elling should not be performed after identify-
ing short-comings in the most simplistic
version of ToRs. This strategy is even less ap-
pealing when we know that these short-com-
ings have been identified—and to a large ex-
tent even solved—a long time ago within the
philosophy of language. We ought to learn to
appreciate each of the ToRs and use them
whenever appropriate; each of them has its
merits. The relationship between theoretical
discussions of modelling and the practice of
systems development is also commented.
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1. Introduction 
Modelling is at the core of most software
development techniques. A development
method is to a large extent determined by
its approach to modelling. A principal
aim of this essay is to analyse implicit
and explicit assumptions within model-
ling techniques concerning reality, the
nature of human knowledge and the rela-
tionship between the model and what is
modelled. The main motivation for this
analysis is that the considerable—and
rapidly growing—challenges for model-
ling caused by the trend towards open
and integrated systems prompt a careful
rethinking of the very task of modelling. 
The modelling techniques considered
are data and object-oriented modelling.
Data-flow modelling and knowledge
representations are, for reasons of clarity,
not discussed explicitly. We are particu-
larly concerned with modelling based on
object-orientation (OO). There are a
number of good reasons for this. OO has
gained momentum lately and therefore
deserves special attention. OO is one, not
to say the, approach to modelling with a
conscious attitude towards the very task
of modelling. We argue that the “natural-
ness” often referred to in connection
with OO is readily understood within a
conceptual framework of the kind we
employ in our analysis. 
The heart of our analysis, then, is to
compare modelling with a body of theo-
ries known from the philosophy of lan-
guage as theories of reference (ToRs).
They all deal with the same basic prob-
lem as in modelling. As the fundamental
problem addressed in modelling and
ToRs is comparable, it seems reasonable
to analyze modelling by relating it to the
older and more elaborate ToRs.
This idea of explicitly comparing and
discussing modelling with ToRs is, as
such, not original. (Lyytinen 1987, Klein
et al. 1992, Stamper 1987, Winograd et
al. 1986) all do this. But—and this we
will argue is crucial—they all discuss
only one ToR, the most naive represent-
ative of the body of theories comprising
ToRs. We draw several implications
from this. First, correcting philosophi-
cally misguided interpretations found in
the literature has a certain value of its
own. But it becomes vastly more impor-
tant when these misconceptions are
found, albeit less explicitly, in much of
the analysis of modelling. Second, we ar-
gue that these philosophically inaccurate
interpretations are, as an immediate con-
sequence of discussing only the simplest
member of the body of ToRs, quite un-
satisfactory when analyzing certain mo-
dern OO modelling approaches. Third,
and most importantly, we sincerely be-
lieve that to learn about and understand
the major challenges facing modelling
one should strive to relate the different
positions to each other. To learn from
others presuppose the existence of at
least some common grounds. Generally
speaking, there are two strategies when
presenting a body of theories: to under-
line their continuity or to highlight their
points of discontinuity. By discussing
ToRs as a body of theories, we are pursu-
ing the former of these strategies. This
may be read as a claim that there are no
essential differences among them. We
would like to warn against such a read-
ing. Rather, we believe that underlining
the continuity may serve an important
pedagogical function in encouraging a
more open discussion. To us, it also
seems to be a more promising strategy
within modelling than to keep looking
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for “the correct” philosophical theory. It
is, after all, primarily the practice of
modelling, not its philosophical founda-
tion, that need to be altered. 
The remainder of this essay is organ-
ized in the following manner. Sections 2,
3 and 4 present and discuss three differ-
ent ToRs. They are two-levelled ToRs,
three-levelled ToRs and phenomenolo-
gy, respectively. For each we give (i) an
outline of the core of the theory, (ii) iden-
tify which kind of modelling it corre-
sponds to and (iii) discuss the limitations
of the theory. Sections 5 and 6 present al-
ternative theories which have been sug-
gested as a basis for modelling elsewhere
in the literature. These are hermeneutics,
social construction, speech acts and lan-
guage games. We indicate how at least
parts of these alternative theories may be
viewed from the point of phenomenolo-
gy. Implications for modelling are simul-
taneously discussed. The conclusions of
our analysis falls in two categories and is
given separately in sections 7 and 8. In
section 7 we criticize related work on
conceptual analysis of modelling. Sec-
tion 8 spells out what we see as the les-
sons relevant to modelling of open and
integrated systems. Section 9 offers a
few concluding remarks.
2. Two-levelled ToR
Theories of reference have been devel-
oped within the philosophy of language
to explain how linguistic entities (words,
sentences, propositions, …) accomplish
the truly extraordinary task of referring,
i.e. to point to the essentially non-lin-
guistic entities of our surrounding world.
ToRs represent a contribution to an ac-
count of human knowledge in the fol-
lowing sense. Linguistic behaviour is as-
sumed to be systematically based on a
shared (and reasonable equal) knowl-
edge of the meaning of the expressions
involved. An important component of
this knowledge is what the expressions
refer to in the world. Exactly this proper-
ty of expressions is it ToRs try to account
for. To give a semantics for a language,
on this basis, amounts to two things: to
explain how expressions refer and to ex-
plain how communication is possible.
2.1. The contents of the two-levelled 
theory
A ToR is intended to account for the ref-
erential aspect of all kinds of expres-
sions. For the present purposes, however,
it suffices to restrict attention to proper
names and singular designators, i.e. ex-
pressions of the form: “John”, “Lon-
don”, “the king of Norway”, etc.
The simplest, but in many respects
the most natural, variant of a ToR is the
two-levelled one. It is old; it dates back
to Plato (Harrison 1979, p. 23). The basic
idea is simple and intriguing. The names
and designators are viewed as labels
which attach to objects in the world. The
expression “John”, for instance, is asso-
ciated with the object (or rather: person)
John. This labelling relationship be-
tween “John” (the expression) and John
(the person) is what is known and ex-
ploited by the participants engaged in
linguistic behaviour. The meaning of
compound expressions containing
“John” is then recognized as a label for
John; recognition of these labels is what
makes it possible to speak about non-lin-
guistic objects like John (the person).
The two-levelled theory provides an ap-
pealing and intuitive explanation of how
(this part of) language functions. Our
3
Hanseth and Monteiro: MODELLING AND THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 1994
O. Hanseth & E. Monteiro 28
mastering of (this part of) language
amounts to nothing but a capacity to
know and recognize which labels do, or
do not, attach to which objects; we rec-
ognize a set of links.
Two-level ToRs are related to real-
ism, which we, for the purpose of the
present discussion, define as follows. It
amounts to the view that there exists,
perfectly independently of human cogni-
tive capacity or activity, a world of ob-
jects. As this world exists independently
of human cognition, these objects have
to be objective, i.e. perceived equal for
all human beings; one perceives the ob-
ject. Two-levelled ToRs makes it con-
ceivable to set up a one-to-one corre-
spondence (more precisely: a bijection)
between the names and the objects which
subsequently makes all objects accessi-
ble via language. 
2.2. Two-levelled theory and modelling
The question, then, is which kind of
modelling corresponds to two-levelled
ToRs. The answer is, as a number of peo-
ple have noted, data modelling. Data
modelling employs a wide range of tech-
niques, methods and notational appara-
tus. We focus on the entity-relation (E-R)
modelling technique. In this respect we
follow (Klein et al. 1992, p. 206) and
(Lyytinen 1987, p. 9) who also gloss over
possible differences among modelling
approaches.1
E-R models lend themselves to a
quite straightforward interpretation as a
two-levelled ToR (Klein et al. 1992, p.
207). The named “entities” correspond
to the objects of the real-world and are
identified through attributes (properties).
The relations (in the E-R model) simply
record relationships holding between the
real-world objects. 
2.3. Limitations of the two-levelled 
theory
Two-levelled ToRs have an attractive-
ness, due to the intuitive idea of attach-
ing labels, which should not be neglect-
ed. It is also a fact that it took roughly
two thousand years before someone
came up with an essentially better expla-
nation. During this time, a number of
problematic issues were raised. They
may be viewed as a set of challenges or
puzzles which the two-levelled ToRs fail
to answer. It is well beyond the scope of
our discussion to deal in any detail with
these.2 We point out only two such issues
which should make it clear that the two-
levelled ToRs are too simple-minded to
capture a sufficient portion of the rele-
vant aspects related to referring. The first
problem is how to explain the meaning
of names with no object. The second
problem is how to associate multiple
names with one object. The first is often
illustrated by the following example:
what does “Pegasus” refer to? As the ob-
ject Pegasus (the mythical horse with
wings) does not exist, how is it possible
to maintain that linguistic behaviour in-
volving “Pegasus” is based on the mutu-
al recognition of its meaning, i.e. what it
refers to? Two-levelled ToRs simply
have no satisfactory answer. The prob-
lem with multiple names is that one gains
absolutely nothing which one did not
have already with a single name. Consid-
er a case where both “John” and “the
man in the corner” both refer to John (the
person). But in compound expressions
either of these names exactly the same
happens: both names are simply place-
holders which are immediately filled by
John (the person). In both cases the
placeholder or label merely serves to im-
port the object and the overall effects are
4
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identical in both cases. Such objections,
as (Klein et al. 1992, Lyytinen 1987,
Stamper 1987) note, are equally valid for
data modelling in general and E-R mod-
elling in particular. 
3.  Three-levelled ToR
Three-levelled ToRs should be viewed as
a response—or even a solution—to a
number of the weaknesses of two-lev-
elled ToRs. Three-levelled ToRs are due
to Frege (Geach et al. 1952). What fol-
lows below draws upon (Dummett 1973,
Dummett 1981, Harrison 1979). Frege’s
ToR clearly has a historical and concep-
tual value of its own. We will, however,
do little to pay justice to this. Our interest
focuses on how this theory resolves the
problems encountered with the two-lev-
elled theory and discuss modelling cor-
responding to three-levelled ToRs. In so
doing, OO modelling will play an impor-
tant role.
3.1. The contents of the theory
The basic move in the three-levelled
ToRs is to change from the situation on
the left (two-levelled ToRs) to the one on
the right i Figure 1.
In addition, it is stipulated that the
recognized meaning which we rely upon
in communication is the sense of the ex-
pression. Recall that what a two-levelled
ToR relies on is the recognition of certain
binary relations holding between pairs of
expressions and objects. With the three-
levelled theory, primacy is placed on the
sense. The meaning of an expression is
its sense. We return later to the question
of exactly what the sense is. What is
clear is that one—but not every—aspect
of sense is the capacity to produce the
reference.
This alone is sufficient to resolve a
number of the difficulties experienced
with two-levelled ToRs. Again, we will
give only an outline of this, which suits
our purposes related to data modelling.
We only discuss the two problems cited
in section 2.3 above: non-existing refer-
ences (objects) and multiple names.
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The problem with names with no ref-
erence, like the case of “Pegasus”, is
straightforwardly resolved. The sense of
“Pegasus” is what is communicable.
This is communicable despite the fact
that one aspect of the sense, its capacity
to produce a reference, is not possible to
realize in this case.
The issue with multiple names—and
thereby multiple senses—having the
same reference was important to Frege.
A famous example of his was to consider
the two designators “the morning star”
and “the evening star”. Each expression
has a definite, but distinct, sense. They
do, however, both refer to the same ob-
ject—the planet Venus. The two senses
represent two distinct perspectives of the
same object. The ability to maintain dif-
ferent perspectives—which vary from
person to person, and over time—of one
and the same object was essential to
Frege. That the two senses both refer to
Venus is by no means evident from the
senses themselves (which indicate plan-
ets appearing at different times of the
day); it was in fact the result of a not-too-
distant astronomic discovery. 
Due to the importance Frege placed
on the sense of an expression, it would be
reasonable to expect a relatively thor-
ough treatment of what the sense is.
Frege was, however, rather reluctant to
provide any information on this vital is-
sue. He insisted that the sense of a com-
plete sentence was a thought. A thought
is the fundamental unit of communica-
tion.3 The senses of the constituents of
an expression are given (indirectly) by
stipulating that sense was compositional,
that each part of the expression contrib-
utes systematically to the sense of the
complete expression.4 
Frege had high expectations for his
theory. Not only was it to account for
how expressions referred, it was also in-
tended to explain how communication is
possible. We give a sketch of his expla-
nation as this is illuminating for our later
discussion, especially in connection with
speech act theory in section 6.
Frege wanted to ensure that his ex-
planation of communication did not rely
upon essentially private or individualis-
tic mechanisms. The problem is to devise
an inter-subjective criteria or condition
prevailing under successful communica-
tion, i.e. to characterize what it amounts
to understand the communicated mes-
sage. This characterization will, as Frege
was well aware of, vary with the kind of
sentence (or speech act: assertion, imper-
ative, promise, …). Frege’s answer for
the kind of sentences he was primarily
interested in—the declarative ones
which make up the subject matter of
mathematics and logic—was two-fold.
Firstly, he claimed that the relevant char-
acterization or condition was that such a
sentence did have a definite truth value,
true or false. Secondly, he insisted that
the capability to recognize the truth con-
ditions of a declarative sentence is an
universal, human capability. It is this in-
ter-subjective capacity, Frege held,
which ensures that declarative sentences
are communicable.
3.2. Three-levelled theory and 
modelling
OO modelling, i.e. OOA & D, is in a
number of ways similar to data model-
ling. In what follows, we address two is-
sues which deviate from ordinary model-
ling and contribute in giving OO its dis-
tinctive flavour:
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• the appeal to the “naturalness” of
OO modelling;
• the possibility of going beyond
(what corresponds to) two-levelled
ToRs with OO;
Let us first inquire closer what the al-
leged “naturalness” of OO modelling
amounts to, and, more specifically, char-
acterize the basis of this claim.
Our suggestion may be stated within
our analytic framework of ToRs: the
“naturalness” of OO modelling rests on a
kinship with two-levelled ToRs. In OO
modelling one only needs one kind of en-
tity—the object.
To back up our suggestion that the
naturalness of OO modelling stems from
its affinity with two-levelled ToRs, what
is required is to document how OO mod-
elling makes appeal to the small “seman-
tic gap” between an object in the world
and an object in the model.
As a recent handbook puts it: 
“A good way of thinking of an
object-oriented system is of a
space which contains many inde-
pendent objects. (...). This view
of a system is intended to match,
or in some sense model, the sys-
tem as it might appear as a col-
lection of cooperating physical
objects, or indeed people, in the
‘real world’ ” (Atkins et al. 1991,
p. 39/3, emphasis added).
Similarly, from a well-known text book
in OO:
“In this manner, each object in
our solution embodies its own
unique behaviour, and each one
models some object in the real
world. From this perspective, an
object is simply a tangible entity
which exhibits some well-
defined behaviour. Objects do
things, and we ask them to per-
form what they do by sending
them messages. Because our
decomposition is based upon
objects and not algorithms, we
call this object-oriented decom-
position.” (Booch 1991, p. 15)
which continues:
“(A)n object-oriented view of the
world, (with) objects, as abstrac-
tions of entities in the real world”
(Booch 1991, p. 17) 
or:
“More realistic modelling. OO
analysis models the enterprise or
application area in a way that is
closer to the reality than conven-
tional analysis” (Martin 1993, p.
34)
What this all adds up to, then, is that OO
is “natural”:
“Indeed many people who have
no training in computer science
and no idea how a computer
works find the object-oriented
model of problem solving quite
natural.” (Budd 1987, p. 4, em-
phasis added)
and:
“The OO way of thinking is more
natural for most people than the
techniques of structured analysis
and design. After all, the world
consists of objects.” (Martin
1993, p. 31)
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Recalling the serious limitations of two-
levelled ToRs exposed earlier, our claim
about OO modelling is disturbing. The
problems, for instance regarding multi-
ple names, are so immediate that one has
found ways to cope with them—but not
at the level of modelling. For instance,
having two distinct pointers pointing to
one and the same object is a solution, not
at the level of modelling, but at the level
of programming. Multiple inheritance in
OO programming languages falls in the
same category. Our concern lies with
how to handle these problems systemati-
cally at the level of modelling.
A recent survey of OO modelling is
utterly pragmatic about these issues. Due
to the presence of OO programming lan-
guages with multiple inheritance (and
hence a lattice of inheritance relations),
OO modelling should also permit a cor-
responding modelling lattice (Monarchi
et al. 1992, p. 40). This survey does not,
however, include the ability to handle
perspectives among the “critical compo-
nents” of OO modelling (Monarchi et al.
1992, p. 39), but grant that this problem
belongs to “future research” (Monarchi
et al. 1992, p. 45).
There has, however, been some work
within OO in attempting to overcome the
limitations of two-levelled ToRs by sys-
tematically introducing notions of “per-
spective” (or “roles”, or “views”, etc.) at
the level of modelling. Even if this de-
velopment is conceivable also outside of
OO, it is fact that it has been most thor-
oughly addressed within OO modelling.5
As explained in section 2.2, this repre-
sents an essential step beyond two-lev-
elled ToRs—in the direction of three-
levelled ToRs. OORAS, for instance, is
an attempt to systematically incorporate
the concept of perspective at the level of
modelling (Reenskaug et al. 1992). In
OORAS a collaborating set of objects is
grouped into a role. One role corre-
sponds to one perspective. Two or more
roles may subsequently be “synthesized”
into one while maintaining two perspec-
tives. Given two models which, say, give
two perspectives on the role “person”,
one as an employee-in-a-firm and one as
a leader-of-a-project, these two perspec-
tives may be synthesized. This synthesis
gives rise to a new model, an employee-
and-project leader model. But simultane-
ously the two original ones are kept ac-
cessible. As a consequence, when mod-
elling a specific person one may chose
which of the three perspectives to em-
ploy: the employee, the project leader or
the employee-and-project-leader. OO-
RAS does not correspond to two-lev-
elled ToRs. 
3.3. Limitations of the three-levelled 
theory
The ability of three-levelled ToRs to in-
corporate different perspectives at the
level of modelling is a significant ad-
vance over two-levelled ToRs. But the
theory has its limitations. The number of
different perspectives are finite and giv-
en. It cannot account for an “open” situ-
ation with an indefinite number of per-
spectives or aspects, i.e. a context, back-
ground or horizon. This brings us to the
third class of ToRs which is Husserl’s
phenomenology, a full-fledged episte-
mological framework.
4.  Phenomenology
There are interesting structural similari-
ties between Husserl’s phenomenology
and Frege’s three-levelled theory which
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are often over-looked.6 The basic claim
is that phenomenology may be viewed as
an elaboration—in width and depth—of
Frege’s three-levelled theory. In width
because it generalizes from linguistic
acts to acts in general (perception, think-
ing, imagining, physical movement, …),
and in depth because Husserl goes a lot
further in describing the structure and
underlying mechanisms of (what corre-
sponds to) Frege’s sense. We proceed by
discussing the features of phenomenolo-
gy most relevant to our purposes. 
4.1. The contents of phenomenology
An essential aspect of phenomenology is
the view that all acts share a deep struc-
tural similarity. To uncover this structure
is the real subject-matter of phenomenol-
ogy. This leads us to the act of percep-
tion. Perception is at the same time a rep-
resentative act within phenomenology
and a relevant act in connection with
modelling.
The three-levelled theory of Frege
has acounter-part in phenomenology, see
Figure 2. The middle one, the so-called
noema, is what corresponds to Frege’s
sense. The noema structures acts so as to
make them meaningful. It is the structure
of our cognitive activity which gives
meaning to passive sense data. This
structuring is immediate: it is not the
case that we first receive sense data and
then structure or interpret them subse-
quently as an object is recognized. On
the contrary, we are always “thrown”
into an interpretation or way of structur-
ing (in short: have a noema). We are, fur-
thermore, normally not aware of the pre-
vailing, current noema. Only through an
effort may the noema be thematized by
directing our attention towards it
(through acts of reflection).
The structuring by noema functions
as a pattern of anticipations. Perceiving
something as a cup, for instance, corre-
sponds to having a noema containing an-
ticipations about the cup such as that it is
round, what it would feel to touch it,
what would happen if we were to pour
coffee into it, etc. The anticipations con-
cern what may later take place in the sub-
sequent sequence of acts directed to-
wards the object. The components of this
pattern of anticipations may be viewed
as a horizon against which we under-
stand the surrounding world. 
An essential concept in Husserl’s
phenomenology is that of evidence. De-
spite its connotations (in both English
and German “Evidenz”), it should not be
read in an uncompromising sense, sig-
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of an act is simply the set of components
of the anticipations or horizon which al-
ready has been confirmed by carrying
out acts. E.g. that, by turning the cup
around, we have established that our an-
ticipation about the cup being round did,
indeed, hold true. Even though Husserl
on numerous occasions wrote about
achieving “absolute certainty” and the
necessity of providing a secure “basis for
all of science”, it was fundamental for
Husserl that evidence for a given noema
was normally partial or incomplete—
that we may always be mistaken.7 More
specifically, in acts of perception of
physical objects, a highly relevant act in
connection with data modelling, Husserl
held that one could never achieve com-
plete evidence. The reason is that such
objects—like that bulk of our everyday
objects—contain an inexhaustible sup-
ply of anticipations which may never be
completely confirmed.8 Our everyday
objects, according to phenomenology,
allow for an infinite number of perspec-
tives. Our knowledge of these everyday
objects is essentially incomplete. We
learn to conduct our lives based on the fi-
nite approximations we already have ac-
quired. 
Anticipations need not be confirmed
in the course of carrying out subsequent
acts; they may be frustrated. This causes
a re-structuring of the noema (it ex-
plodes, or to use the term of (Winograd et
al. 1986): a “break-down” occurs). The
re-structuring may be more or less pro-
found. It may result in a simple modifi-
cation a few of the other anticipations of
the noema—or it may produce such a
dramatic re-structuring that it makes
good sense to talk about a new noema.
4.2. Phenomenology and modelling
There do not exist modelling techniques
directly based on phenomenology. An
hypothetical example would be to ana-
lyze the users’ noemas and thereby un-
cover the true reality. The closest real ex-
ample would be frames from AI. But
even if frames were proposed to mimic
anticipations, they only contain a finite
number of perspectives. Even if phe-
nomenology has not been used directly
as a basis for modelling, there are a
number of approaches to modelling
which may, at least partly, be understood
from a phenomenological point of view
(see sections 5 and 6 below). As the ap-
proaches presented in these two sections
are supposed, e.g. in (Winograd et al.
1986, Lyytinen 1987, Klein et al. 1992),
to have absolutely nothing in common
with ToRs, particularly the two-levelled
ones, our claim is not obvious; it has to
be argued. There is thus a non-negligea-
ble element of irony in the fact that these
approaches are worked out just because
ToRs have been found useless.
4.3. Limitations of phenomenology
Granted that phenomenology is consid-
ered a full-fledged theory of the condi-
tions and contents of human knowledge,
it follows that phenomenology, in princi-
ple, has no limitations. This does, of
course, by-pass the question of how ac-
curately phenomenology does indeed ac-
count for human knowledge, and wheth-
er phenomenology is useful for actually
accounting for specific instances of hu-
man knowledge. 
10
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5. Hermeneutics and Social 
Construction
We discuss now efforts to base model-
ling on philosophical hermeneutics and
social construction. Instead of presenting
these as two approaches unrelated to
ToRs in general and the two-levelled the-
ory in particular (Klein et al. 1992,
Lyytinen 1987, Dahlbom 1992), we indi-
cate how some elements of hermeneutics
and social construction could be viewed
from phenomenology. 
We discuss two issues within herme-
neutics (Gadamer 1976). Firstly, in phil-
osophical hermeneutics it is stressed that
knowledge and understanding is contex-
tual—that it takes place against a back-
ground, pre-justice or horizon (Gadamer
1976, p. 9). There is no such thing as an
empty horizon; understanding can only
take place against an horizon of pre-un-
derstanding. Secondly, through reflec-
tion, it is possible to gain access to, to be-
come aware of, elements of our horizon,
to uncover certain of its taken-for-grant-
ed elements.
Both of these issues, the necessary
pre-understanding and the possibility of
uncovering, have a counterpart inside a
phenomenological framework. Firstly,
the noema, which induces meaning upon
the acts, is structured as a pattern of an-
ticipations—a horizon. Knowledge is al-
ways contextual or relative to this hori-
zon. A necessary pre-condition for un-
derstanding during an act is the active
structuring by the noema. The set of an-
ticipations, the horizon, may impose a
varying degree of structure depending on
how much evidence has been accumulat-
ed in support of the noema. But the noe-
ma is never empty in the sense that it
does not contain the anticipations, the
horizon. This situation should be careful-
ly distinguished from the one where no
evidence is provided yet. This latter case
corresponds to the situation immediately
after engaging in a new act: we have an-
ticipations, but no one has been con-
firmed or frustrated yet. Secondly,
through an act of reflection, as depicted
below, it is possible to make the object of
a new act (with noema-2) be the original
noema (noema-1). See Figure 3.
A special kind of reflection, the phe-
nomenological reduction,9 was intended
by Husserl as a route towards uncovering
the general structure of noema. It in-
volves two steps: the eidetic reduction
whereby the original object is “bracket-
ed” and the transcendental reduction
whereby one directs attention towards
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thus has a quite definite meaning, name-
ly as one phase of the phenomenological
reduction, and is not the kind of non-
committing activity of choosing to over-
look certain aspects of an act which one
could be led to believe in (Klein et al.
1992, p. 214).
A, if not the, primary source for the
concept of social construction is the
work of Berger and Luckmann. They
write:
“The method we consider best
suited to clarify the foundations
of knowledge in everyday life is
that of phenomenological analy-
sis.” (Berger et al. 1966, p. 34)
The fundamental claim of social con-
struction is that the way we perceive and
think: acquire knowledge, about the sur-
rounding world is essentially social. It is
shaped and modified through social in-
teraction. This amounts, from the phe-
nomenological point of view, to nothing
but a claim that the always present (cf.
remarks on hermeneutics above) set of
anticipations, the horizon, is socially
shaped. This is consistent with Husserl’s
views on the inter-subjective character of
noema. He coined the term Lifeworld for
the huge set of socially and culturally es-
tablished components of the noema. Es-
pecially in the later phases of his writing
Husserl underscored this aspect of the
noema.10 In (Dahlbom 1992) the origins
and contents of the idea of social con-
struction are traced. Social construction
is discussed and related to an impressing
number of recent positions, but without
bringing in phenomenology. We find this
unfortunate, not because (Dahlbom
1992) does not contain a sufficient num-
ber of positions already, but for pedagog-
ical reasons. Explaining how social con-
struction may be related to ToRs, as op-
posed to representing a completely inde-
pendent position, could, hopefully, make
the communication between the two
camps easier. 
Having underlined the kinship be-
tween phenomenology and social con-
struction, it must be acknowledged that
the rapidly growing stock of literature on
documented cases of the minute mecha-
nisms whereby this social construction
actually takes place goes far beyond
what Husserl ever described, see e.g.
(Bijker et al. 1989 and 1992). 
6. Speech Act Theory and Language 
Games
Speech act theory and language games
are sometimes argued to be completely
different from ToRs, see e.g. (Winograd
et al. 1986, Kensing et al. 1991). We
agree that these two approaches have a
somewhat different aim in that referring
is not the principal focus of interest. Still,
insofar as they are accounts of linguistic
behaviour, which necessarily also in-
cludes the ability to refer, they cannot
side-step referring altogether. Further-
more, there are issues where speech act
theory do share similarities with Frege’s
three-levelled theory which should be
acknowledged. We believe it is some-
what inaccurate to portray speech act
theory and language games as complete-
ly unrelated to ToRs.
Searle, an important contributor to
speech act theory, quite explicitly de-
scribes his theory not as an alternative
but as:
 “(...) (A) study of the meaning of
sentences (such as ToRs) is not in
12
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principle distinct from a study of
speech acts. Properly construed,
they are the same study” (Searle
1969, p. 18). 
This holds for his “principle of expressi-
bility” as well, stating that whatever is
meant (by a person) may, in principle, be
stated (Searle 1969, p. 19). As mentioned
earlier, Frege focused on, to use Searle’s
terminology, the illocutionary act of as-
serting. The corresponding perlocution-
ary act, i.e. the corresponding effect the
illocutionary act has upon the hearer/
reader, was that of the recognition of
truth conditions. Frege did, however,
identify other aspects of an expression
relevant to its meaning not captured by
the sense which he called tone (German:
Beleutung) and colouring (German: Fär-
bung). But he did not do very much to
characterize the inter-subjective mecha-
nisms whereby these parts of the expres-
sions’ meaning may be communicated.
Speech act theory goes a far way towards
a remedy for this.
An important reason for the interest
in speech act theory is due to the expec-
tations that this theory could provide an
approach to the essential problem of con-
texts in modelling. Searle is concerned
with this problem, not so much in the
most widely cited book (Searle 1969),
but more in for instance (Searle 1980). A
treatment of context—or background—
very much in the spirit of phenomenolo-
gy (Dreyfus 1982, p. 4–9). 
As for speech act theory, language
games have attracted interest partly be-
cause they supposedly allow for an alter-
native role and explanation of context
(Rommetveit 1983). Our practical expe-
rience and awareness of different lan-
guage games constitute the context
against which expressions acquire mean-
ing. Much has been said and written
about the different phases of Wittgen-
stein’s work and about the (dis)continui-
ty of the early and late Wittgenstein. We
have absolutely no intention of getting
involved in the details of this controver-
sial issue. That would take us well be-
yond the scope of this essay. Languages
games are usually regarded to have little
or nothing to do with ToRs. Neverthe-
less, there exist interpretations which do
connect language games with Frege’s
ideas (Hintikka et al. 1986, Harrison
1979, p. 208 and 249).11
7. Critique of Related Work
7.1. Two-levelled vs. three-levelled ToRs
Two- and three-levelled ToRs differ on a
number of essential issues. These issues
are not only of scholastic interest, they
are highly relevant to modelling. One
should accordingly be careful to distin-
guish between the two theories. This,
however, does hardly seem to be case.
We have expressed dissatisfaction with
elements of the related work of (Lyytin-
en 1987, Klein et al. 1992, Stamper
1987). Important objections against this
work have, nevertheless, not yet been
presented. Within our analytic frame-
work of ToRs, these may quite precisely
be stated as follows: (i) their arguments
only apply to two-levelled ToRs; and,
furthermore, (ii) they confuse the dis-
tinction between two-levelled and three-
levelled ToRs. Our critique does, of
course, not imply that we disagree with
all of their views; they certainly contain
valuable insights. It simply means that
we focus on points of disagreement,
13
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points which we consider important
enough to deserve attention. In what fol-
lows we primarily concentrate on
(Lyytinen 1987). 
Lyytinen describes an approach to in-
formation modelling, called “reality
mapping” (RM), which he maintains
capture most approaches to modelling.
He then sets out to criticize RM and con-
cludes that RM cannot provide a basis
for modelling. Our first task is to relate
the position called RM by Lyytinen to
our analytic framework: which kind of
ToR is RM? The answer is simple. It is a
two-levelled ToR. This is immediate
from the implications Lyytinen draws
from the RM position:
“The principle of correspond-
ance states that every sentence in
the UoDD (universe of discourse
description) corresponds to us-
ers’ observations about entities.
The UoDD presents these and
there is a one-to-one correspond-
ance between the (information
system) and the UoD” Lyytinen
1987, p. 11).
and: 
“(RM) would not be able to make
distinctions between referential
and purposeful meaning: it
would make the meaning of
terms like ‘a morning star’ and
‘an evening star’ synonymous,
though they are not.” (Lyytinen
1987, p. 12)
His criticism of RM does not apply to
three-levelled ToRs. This is obvious
from his remarks on intentional (or
opaque) contexts. A very fundamental
motivation for Frege for developing his
theory was to explain—not to ban—in-
tentional sentences:
“So-called intentional sentences
are excluded. They relate propo-
sitions about facts to subjects;
they express propositional atti-
tudes such as ‘A thinks that it is
true that p’. The truth-values of
such senteces are opaque; i.e.
they cannot be composed from
the truth-values of their compo-
nents. Accordingly, they do not
mean anything.” (Lyytinen 1987,
p. 11)
Frege’s explanation was to employ the
distinction between sense and reference.
In non-intentional contexts one may sub-
stitute expressions as long as the refer-
ence is constant. One may, for instance,
pass from ‘I see the morning star’ to ‘I
see the evening star’ without altering the
truth-value. In intentional contexts one
cannot, as Lyytinen notes, simply substi-
tute expressions so as to preserve the ref-
erence. Frege was well aware of this. He
even proceeded to give a solution: in in-
tentional sentences the sense also has to
be preserved. From ‘I believe that I see
the morning star’, it is thus not appropri-
ate to state ‘I believe that I see the
evening star’.
The fact that Lyytinen’s argument ap-
plies only to the simplistic two-levelled
ToRs, an argument put forward with a
considerable amount of extravagance, is
made still more problematic by the fact
that he fails to distinguish between two-
levelled and three-levelled ToRs. As we
have already pointed out, the short-com-
ings of two-levelled ToRs which Lyytin-
en identifies are well-known; indeed,
three-levelled ToRs came about in order
14
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to solve them! It is thus quite misguided
to write:
“The basic tenents of the reality
mapping originate from analytic
philosophy and mathematical
logic. In particular, such scholars
as Frege (...), Wittgenstein (...)
and Tarski (...)” (Lyytinen 1987,
p. 10)
—without discriminating among these.
Tarski’s account of semantics, the model
theoretical one underlying classical logic
and (most) use of formalisms in compu-
ter science, is a two-levelled ToR.12 But
Frege’s theory is definitely not.
7.2. Systems development and 
“multiperspective reflection”
An important, perhaps even distinguish-
ing, feature of the Scandinavian ap-
proach to systems development is the
emphasis on the need for shifting or var-
ying perspectives. The concept of “mul-
tiperspective reflection”, the willingness
and ability of systems developers to sys-
tematically adopt different perspectives
when approaching a situation, is obvi-
ously a desirable skill in systems devel-
opment. The problem, however, is how
this multiperspective reflection comes
about. In phenomenology it is empha-
sized that one normally would not be
aware, much less able to chose, the per-
spective; we are “thrown” into a perspec-
tive. It is only through an effort of reflec-
tion one may thematize our own perspec-
tive, that our perspective becomes
accessible to us. This kind of reflection is
a skill which has to be established or per-
fected—it cannot simply be stated. 
8. Discussion: Complexity and 
Limitations of Modelling
In what follows, we attempt to spell out
relevant implications from our earlier
discussion related to modelling strate-
gies, in particular strategies for the de-
velopment of open systems and systems
integration. We consider this latter issue
to be a primary one in systems develop-
ment in the years to come when National
Information Infrastructures and Trans-
European Information Infrastructures to-
gether with systems supporting globali-
zation strategies of private companies
are to be implemented.
The philosophical positions we have
described are seemingly ordered linear-
ly: Two levelled ToRs gives the most
simplistic picture of the world, the fol-
lowing ones give richer and more com-
plex pictures. Each offer solutions to
shortcomings in the previous, with
hermeneutics and social constructivism
as the most complex. Accordingly, it can
be argued that hermeneutics and social
constructivism are the (most) correct po-
sitions. On this basis, a plausible conclu-
sion could be that we should work out
modelling approaches based on this cor-
rect position. This conclusion has been
drawn by some scholars. Winograd and
Flores conclude that the technical-ration-
al approach is “faulty” and should be re-
placed by hermeneutic ones (Winograd
et al. 1986). They propose one such
based on speech act theory. So far, this
approach has not been an unambiguous
success (Suchman 1993).
Klein and Lyytinen suggest that one
should give up trying to model the reality
(Klein et al. 1992, p. 211). They propose
that one should rather model user lan-
guages, and that this modelling should
15
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take place within a hermeneutic meta-
theoretical framework. We are sympa-
thetic to the latter part of their conclu-
sion, but cannot see how modelling user
languages instead of “real objects” can
help. Languages are used to describe re-
ality, but they are also indeed part of re-
ality in itself. All problems involved in
ordinary modelling are likely to pop up
when following this recommendation,
and possibly some additional ones.
It thus seems that the strategy of re-
forming the practice of systems develop-
ment by starting from a “correct” philo-
sophical position, say social construc-
tion, is less than effective. In order to
work out a more effective strategy, one is
lead to consider at least the following is-
sues:
1. how should we now understand no-
tions such as “theories” and “mod-
els”;
2. which status has other philosophical
positions from a constructivist per-
spective;
3. what is the relation between philo-
sophical positions and practical sys-
tems development?
The two first issues have been discussed
to some extent within the social con-
structivist studies of science and technol-
ogy community. It is referred to as the
“reflexivity” problem, i.e. the problem of
applying the same perspectives on one’s
own work as on others. It raises the ques-
tion of whether there is any privileged
positions from where to study the others.
This issue is a rather controversial one,
see for instance (Woolgar 1988, Collins
et al. 1992). The upshot of it, for the
present purposes, is that theories, models
and philosophical positions are also so-
cial constructions. They are true because
a community agrees they are within the
context of their use and based on the
shared background of the members of
the community. Accordingly, it is impos-
sible to develop a social constructivist
approach to modelling which may help
us overcome the problems with existing
modelling approaches. Believing that
such an approach is possible is a contra-
diction, it presumes the premises of na-
ive realist positions rejected by social
constructivism. 
The third issue involves both concep-
tual and a pragmatic considerations. Let
us here focus on the latter, the pragmatics
of influencing the practice of systems de-
velopment through improved under-
standing of their philosophical underpin-
ning. There is obviously a link between
(improved) understanding and (im-
proved) practice. The question, however,
is not the existence of such a link but its
strength. To improve practice through
improved understanding presupposes a
strong link. A conceptual argument
against such strong link can be made, but
we refrain from this here. From a prag-
matic point of view, the cases listed
above related to (Winograd et al. 1986,
Suchman 1993, Klein et al. 1992) all
count as evidence for the weakness of
this link in systems development.
Philosophical criticism of modelling
approaches may be useful. It may help
us, not to develop new philosophically
correct approaches, but to better under-
stand the limits of modelling, and how
we can apply it more successfully. Both
the theoretical analysis given above and
practical experience indicate that both
traditional modelling and two or three-
levelled ToRs are powerful tools. They
are suitable for a number of tasks. The
challenge is to learn to recognize their
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limitations. From the simplistic concep-
tion in two-levelled ToRs, with its pairs
of labels and objects, three-levelled
ToRs allows for perspectives, and in phe-
nomenology all knowledge is contextual
(relative to the horizon of the noema).
In the seventies Management Infor-
mation Systems (the MIS concept) was
considered the systems concept of the fu-
ture. This concept was proposed as an
answer to problems related to the fact
that the different information systems
within an organization contained partial-
ly the same data, leading to inconsisten-
cies, redundancies and unnecessary
work (registration of the same data sev-
eral times). The core of the MIS concept
was one, shared data model for the whole
company, implemented as a corporate
data base. The concept turned out to be a
failure. In (Marche 1993) parts of the
reasons for this fact is empirically docu-
mented to be the lack of stability in data
models. But the need for integration has
grown due to the rising number of infor-
mation system—and the MIS concept is
currently revitalized, but this time under
the name Enterprise Data Modelling
(Scheer et al. 1992).
Technology and organizational de-
velopment support—and are supported
by—the spreading of open and integrat-
ed systems. Even if the limitations of
modelling based on two-levelled ToRs
has always been present, the inherent
complexity of open and integrated sys-
tems makes these acute today. Integra-
tion is important not only within a com-
pany, but across organizational borders
as well. This is illustrated by the growing
interest for inter-organizational systems
and EDI. Cross-organizational commu-
nication is likely to grow in response to a
trend in organizational change from hier-
archical corporations towards (global)
collaborative networks (Reich 1991). In-
tegration through shared data models is a
strategy for developing closed systems.
Enterprise Data Modelling implies that
the enterprise is considered a closed
world with its specific data model. A
system can neither be integrated with
one in another enterprise, nor with a sys-
tem which is bought from an outside
vendor. Integrating systems across or-
ganizational boundaries through shared
data models implies one data model for
the whole world, which obviously is un-
realistic. 
Here, too, OO is called upon. Some
see OO as a new way to establish an “en-
terprise model” (Martin 1993, p. 9 and
29). Especially within the two-levelled
ToRs which (Martin 1993) is based upon
(cf. section 3.2), this seems naive and
disturbingly similar to the previous ef-
forts concerning MIS mentioned above. 
The only strategy to cope with com-
plexity is to split the “world” into sepa-
rate independent parts in a way that
makes the interaction and interfaces be-
tween the parts as simple as possible. In
the world of information systems, the
concept of open systems is an attempt to
implement this strategy. Open systems
means that most organizations have sev-
eral systems, each considered separate
and independent, and at the same time it
may, in principle, be integrated with any
other through standardized interfaces.
Such an interface could be a protocol for
exchanging EDIFACT messages. Each
separate system in this open world
should focus on areas where the com-
plexity is not beyond what can properly
be understood in terms of two- and three-
level ToRs, and they can be developed
using traditional modelling techniques.
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In more technical terms, this splits the
“world” into manageable sub-worlds
which allow modelling according to
two- or three-levelled ToRs. The overall
picture, the world of open systems,
could, if required, be interpreted accord-
ing to hermeneutical and social construc-
tion frameworks. 
9. Conclusion
Our aim is, of course, not just to point out
that what (Lyytinen 1987, Klein et al.
1992, Stamper 1987) criticize is two-lev-
elled ToRs. That their critique have seri-
ous shortcomings from a philosophical
point of view is, in itself, not necessarily
a relevant objection in the context of in-
formation modelling. If all modelling ad-
heres to two-levelled ToRe, the argu-
ment, even if philosophically misguided,
could be relevant in informatics. But this
is not the case. There are modelling dis-
ciplines, such as the OO ones discussed
earlier, which are not two-levelled ToRs.
It is reasonable to expect that challenges
for modelling posed by open and inte-
grated systems will at least call for three-
levelled ToRs. The crucial point is that
by criticizing only two-levelled ToRs,
one is left completely without an answer
when confronted with situations more
challenging than two-levelled ToRs can
cope with. 
There is a strong, but unfortunate,
tendency to polarize the discussion re-
garding modelling. The work we have
concentrated on, i.e. (Lyytinen 1987,
Klein et al. 1992, Stamper 1987), is not
odd pieces. A rather typical scheme
seems to be to argue that (what corre-
sponds to) two-levelled ToRs is without
value and subsequently come up with an
alternative which is supposed to have
nothing in common with the simplistic
ToRs. Winograd & Flores (86) attack the
“rationalistic” approach which may be
seen to be based on a two-levelled ToR.
Likewise in (Gregory 1993), where one
argues against the so-called “ideational”
theory which boils down to two-levelled
ToRs. 
We have argued that this framework,
this body of ToRs, provides a conceptu-
ally more appealing and rewarding
standard for comparing and analyzing
modelling. One should, however, take
care not to be tempted to regard this as
some kind of one-dimensional axis rang-
ing from (largely) “untrue” to increas-
ingly “truer” ones. In a sense it is clearly
so that moving along this axis one gets a
richer picture. It should come as no sur-
prise that elaborate epistemological
frameworks solve more problems than
simplistic ToRs. But modelling is bound
to be less ambitious than epistemology.13
We have to be capable of coping with
modelling, we are necessarily making
simplifications. The real challenge is to
learn more about exactly which simplifi-
cations are appropriate in which situa-
tions. One should rather learn to appreci-
ate each of the ToRs and use them when-
ever appropriate; every one of them has
its merits. 
Embarking upon a conceptual analy-
sis of modelling quickly involves sophis-
ticated theories, many of which belong to
philosophy. Having gone in some detail
into a few of these ourselves, we are ob-
viously not hostile to such endeavors.
There is, nevertheless, precisely because
these theories are so academically chal-
lenging, a danger that they could absorb
all interest. In the present situation, with
a considerable number of suggested bas-
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es for modelling—we have run across
two- and three-levelled ones, phenome-
nology, hermeneutics, social construc-
tion, speech acts and language games—
it is, we believe, time to take the practice
of modelling and its contribution to the
overall systems development project
more seriously. Adding items to an al-
ready long list of philosophical theories
need not be the most effective of strate-
gies for enabling an altered practice. For
this strategy, seeking “the correct” philo-
sophical basis, to influence practical
modelling and systems development,
this new theory has to lead to insights
which are not only new, but which also
enable practical action. This, however,
seems less than likely.
Notes
1Our remarks on the E-R technique apply to most
traditional modelling techniques, we believe. For
instance, the widely used Jackson system develop-
ment (JSD) is probably an even clearer proponent
of two-levelled ToRs (Jackson 1983, Pressman
1992). This is so because, in addition to identifying
entities and entity-structures in much the same
manner as E-R, one is explicitly encouraged to set
up a one-to-one relationship between entities in the
real world and entities in the model. More pre-
cisely, the “initial model step” employs so-called
“system specification diagrams” (SSD) to achieve
exactly this correspondence. One has even incorpo-
rated this at the level of notational conventions:
suffix 0 after the name signifies the real world
object, whereas suffix 1 after the name signifies the
corresponding model representation one.
2They include: how to generalize to other linguistic
expressions than names and designators (what does
a sentence refer to?), indirect speech and other
opaque contexts, how the reference is established,
how to cope with multiple labels, what if the object
does not exists,... For a more elaborate discussion
consult e.g. (Harrison 1979, Kripke 1972, Martin
1988, Monteiro 1992).
3Frege did not by this intend to deny the presence
of other mental entities like pain, feeling, mood,
etc., only the impossibility of communicating
these.
4Employing a technical notation, writing stands(J,
c) for “John stands in the corner”, the principle of
compositionality may be explained more precisely.
Because the fundamental unit is a thought, the
sense of a sentence, s, is known in:
sense_(stands(J,c)) = s = sense_stands (sense_J, sense_c)
The question of what sense_J, the meaning of
“John” is, is then given by:
* (sense_J,?)
which is s with two “holes” * and ?. sense_J is then
the entity which systematically produces a thought
when the two holes * and? are filled in (saturated).
This book-keeping of holes and notation for func-
tions is what we today know as (untyped) lambda
calculus.
5An interesting question, then, is the following. Is
it a pure coincidence that this takes place within
OO modelling? One could, perhaps, imagine that
this was because OO techniques are employed in
particular complex and rich situations. This, how-
ever, is a problematic and question begging posi-
tion, especially from an empirical point of view.
After all, the vast majority of existing computer
systems—including highly complex ones—where
constructed without OO. We would rather be
tempted to speculate that exactly because OO mod-
elling, as outlined above, relies so heavily on the
intuitiveness/ naturalness of the two-levelled the-
ory, the issue receives attention.
6The outline we give of phenomenology having
structural similarities with Frege owes much to the
interpretation of Dagfinn Føllesdal (Føllesdal 1969
and 1979, Dreyfus 1982, Føllesdal 1989). It is fair
to say, however, that his interpretation has “led a
whole generation” (Dreyfus 1982, p. 2). This inter-
pretation is, of course, not unanimous. (Bell 1990),
for instance, argues forcefully against it. To discuss
this question in any detail is well beyond the scope
this essay. It should rather be viewed as one of the
locations where we, albeit not uncontroversial,
underline the continuity—rather than the disconti-
nuity—of ToRs. Dreyfus interpretation of Husserl
as an early contributor to AI (Dreyfus 1982, p. 17)
is likewise out of line with what we present.
7Føllesdal argues forcefully for the interpretation
that Husserl in fact held that complete evidence
was never attainable (Føllesdal 1989). Our discus-
sion does not require this kind of strong thesis; we
concentrate on perception of physical objects
which clearly could attain only incomplete evi-
dence according to Husserl.
8A more accurate description would be the follow-
ing: One never attains complete evidence for such
acts because new anticipations are being generated
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at least as fast as old ones are confirmed during the
sequence of subsequent acts. (The number of antic-
ipations in the noema is thus potentially—not actu-
ally—infinite). A problematic and highly debatable
feature of Husserl’s phenomenology is the fact that
Husserl viewed noema as not having an inexhaust-
ible supply of anticipations! In other words, he
maintained that it was in principle possible to have
complete evidence about a noema. He claimed that
the phenomenological reduction, a special form of
reflection, produced exactly this. We leave this
question aside as it has little bearing upon the thrust
of our argument. This is an essential—as opposed
to merely terminological—difference with Hei-
degger. Heidegger never accepted thesis about the
noema. 
9Despite Husserl’s continued effort to explain his
phenomenological reduction, it still remained
somewhat of a puzzle—even to his close students
(Becker 1970). 
10For further, including critical, remarks on our
presentation of the relationship between phenome-
nology and social construction see (Spielberg
1959, p. 255-256) and (Waldenfels 1992, p. 78-79).
11Hintikka and Hintikka develop an intriguing
argument of how to understand the phases of Witt-
genstein’s work (Hintikka et al. 1986). In relation
to our discussion, one of the most interesting
claims is one to the effect that Wittgenstein was
continually concerned with achieving one, princi-
pal aim, namely to account for how expressions
refer to objects and how they function communica-
tively. In the Tractatus, his answer was the picture
theory relying on ostensive definitions. In the
Investigations, this aim was not abandoned—only
the means. Language-games, as the argument goes,
is not a completely revised framework, it is simply
his revised proposal for how the reference is fixed.
Frege was close to the only philosopher Wittgen-
stein cited with approval. And this does not apply
only to the Tractatus (Harrison 1979, p. 208, Dum-
mett 1981, page 31). There are interpretations of
how language-games could be viewed within ToRs
(Hintikka et al. 1986, Harrison 1979, p. 208 and
249).
12This could be stated even sharper. The whole
idea underlying model theory, namely the possibil-
ity to stand back and, so to speak, ascribe meaning
by defining a function from the language to the
model (typically a suitable mathematical struc-
ture), was quite alien to Frege. He, as did Wittgen-
stein, regarded language as an universal medium
which one could never step in and out of. This
renders the model theoretical approach impossible
(Hintikka et al. 1986, p. 3). 
13Others, e.g (Klein et al. 1992, Lyytinen 1987,
Stamper 1987), effectively assume that it is obvi-
ous that modelling necessarily is ambitious, that it
aims at representing reality. (Chen 1976) is often
cited in support of this. Chen, however, explicitly
states that:
 “It is impossible (and, perhaps unneces-
sary) to record every potentially available
piece of information about entities and rela-
tionships.” 
(Chen 1976, p. 11).
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